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The institution of marriage has served to funnel economic resources from fathers to children. Its 
continued decline in the countries of the developed world threatens the adequacy of the 
economic support of human reproduction, now increasingly provided by women. Its decline is 
also probably implicated in the low birth rates now being registered. The rise of cohabitation has 
not prevented a rise in the proportion of lone parents, and their numbers are growing rapidly. The 
children of lone parents are relatively deprived, both in terms of income and adults’ time for 
child care and housekeeping. Government-supported programs in the United States aimed at 
rescuing marriage have not been proven effective. Ways need to be explored to get a return of 
men’s economic support for reproduction. But the most likely way of repairing at least some of 
the damage to children is a big increase in government provision to the entire population of 
goods and services that children need: health care, high-quality education, child care, decent 
housing, university education. This will require in most countries a big rise in taxes and 
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  Marriage has served a crucial economic function in human society. It is an important part 
of the system of distribution --- the arrangements through which the goods and services that are 
produced in the economy are distributed to their ultimate consumers. Its decline, and possible 
demise, will require a considerable reworking of our economic structure. The institution of 
marriage has been the means by which the male half of the human species has been forced or 
bribed or cajoled into contributing a substantial share of the goods that the offspring they 
engender need in order to survive and thrive. Marriage has provided a pipeline for the 
transmission of goods and services from males to children. The disrepair and decay of that 
pipeline requires a reworking of human institutions, including our economic institutions.  
 
   Marriage has provided benefits for both sexes. For a man, marriage has provided a 
promise of exclusive sexual access, which gave him assurance that he was the father of the 
children to whom he was contributing. It has given him easily available sex, a close connection 
to the children he engenders with a woman, and the household services that she has provided. 
For a woman, marriage has reliably enlisted a male to contribute resources toward the rearing of 
her children. Moreover, when males monopolize productive roles and resources, the only way a 
woman can gain a mainstream level of living for herself and any children she may have is to get 
a male to share his income with her. 
 
  Aspects of marriage vary by culture and era: how the pairing comes about, bride price or 
dowry, the extended or nuclear family, the ease of divorce, the ownership of the children, the 
authority of the husband, the degree of the wife’s seclusion, fertility, the degree of 
companionship, the allocation of household tasks, the tolerance of domestic violence. Until 
recently, the basic design of the institution had not changed. Although human males and females 
never entirely gave up playing the field sexually, most offspring have been born to married 
couples. But change has now arrived. 
 
  There has always been more to marriage than material provision to offspring. There’s 
nurturance, companionship, stability, passing down of property, family alliances, home cooking. 
And of course there’s love (Coontz, 2005). However, the male contribution of provisioning for 
offspring is one of the most important aspects of the institution of marriage. The decline of 
marriage threatens the stability of that provisioning. 
 
  Males do not, of course, provide all of the resources that human offspring receive from 
parents, although sometimes we talk as though they do. (For example, we sometimes talk about 
fathers as “the sole support” of their children.) Mothers, whether or not they hold paying jobs, 
provide a big share of the material support of children, in the form of care services. Mothers who 
hold jobs provide both money and services. 
 
  Male sharing in the provisioning of offspring is an unusual arrangement among 
mammals. Such male sharing was not in force among our own more remote ancestors, before we 
split off from our cousins the great apes. The offspring of almost all other mammals depended 
and still depend entirely or almost entirely on their female parent for sustenance. But at some 
point in the history of the human race, sexual pair bonding became the common practice, and human males began having an obligation to contribute goods and services to the children they 
engendered within the pair bond.  Marriage was the formal recognition of that obligation.  
 
  Of course, a marriage that is celebrated and solemnized, perhaps in a religious ceremony, 
is not absolutely necessary for permanent pair bonding. The birds manage pair bonding and 
substantial male support for offspring without it. But for humans, marriage has been so central, 
that arguably if it decays some other organizing principle is needed. 
 
  The arrangement under which our Pleistocene ancestors reproduced and raised their 
young – what we may call the majority mammalian method--has resurfaced in humans, and will 
probably gain still more ground. The present situation produces a lot of misery. New policies are 
needed to replace some of the functions that marriage previously performed for almost 
everybody, but now fails to perform for an increasing part of the population. 
 
 
2. Marriage is declining everywhere in the developed world. 
 
  In the developed West, this societal institution, so central to human functioning 
throughout history, has been steadily weakening for decades. For 28 developed countries, Table 1 
shows the proportion of the female population that was married, by decade, since 1980, as 
compiled by the UN. In almost all of these countries, the proportion of women who are married 
has been dropping, and is at its historic low. Marriage is not close to disappearing, but that is the 
direction in which it is headed. In all of those countries, the birth rate is below the level that 
would be needed to maintain a population of the current size, in most of them considerably 
lower. 
 
(Table 1 about here.) 
 
  Table 2 shows the history of marriage and fertility in the United States. There, the 
post-war baby boom ended about 1960, and almost every year since has seen a decline in the 
proportion of women who are currently married. About half of American marriages eventually 
end in divorce. Recently, the decline in the proportion of women married has been mostly due to 
an increase in the average age at marriage. People are waiting until their high twenties to wed.  
 
(Table 2 about here.) 
 
  Table 2 also shows the lifetime number of births to women in the United States who are at 
the end of their reproductive life. Their birth rate has been dropping steadily, and is now below 
the replacement rate. A measurement that included the current birth rate of younger women 
would show a higher lifetime rate. This is due to heavy immigration of people of Hispanic and 
Asian origin, whose fertility has been above the replacement rate. The birth rate of people born in 
the U.S. is lower than the replacement rate. We can expect that the children and grandchildren of 
immigrants will behave more like the majority population with respect to fertility, so we can 
expect the U.S. birth rate to drop toward that of Europe as a result. 
 
3. What has caused the decline in marriage? 
 
  We can trace the decline of marriage to two developments, both of which can be attributed to technological change: the improvement of contraception and the entry of women into the 
money economy. Both contributed to the sexual revolution, which legitimized sex for unmarried 
women. As sex became easier to obtain for men outside of marriage, their motivation to marry 
decreased.  
 
  Abstinence from sex by unmarried girls and women, which made sex hard to get for 
unmarried men, was previously bolstered by fear of life-ruining pregnancy. That scarcity of easily 
available sex provided a powerful motive for men to marry. Now the practice of abstinence is 
largely gone, thanks to the scientific advances that have brought us reliable contraception backed 
up by legalized abortion. 
 
  The increasing participation of mothers in paid work is attributable to the rise in the wages 
of women, due to the rise in productivity that has gone on since the industrial revolution, thanks 
to technological change. The rise in men’s wages, from the same cause, increases household 
income, and that should reduce married mothers’ incentive for paid work. However, it is more 
than countered by the direct effect of women’s higher pay. It is women’s greater labor force 
participation, particularly in the professions, that has brought about the rise in women’s status we 
have seen in the latter half of the twentieth century. Thus the decline in marriage and the move 
toward gender equality result from similar causes. The increase in women’s employment , and the 
decrease in discrimination against them in parts of the labor market also strengthened the sexual 
revolution. It also meant that they had a possibility of supporting children without male help. That 
in turn increased the frequency of divorce.  
 
  The theorizing of Gary Becker (1981) attributed the attraction of marriage, not to its role 
in the economic support of children, but to the efficiencies that result from the specialization of 
roles -- men specializing in activity in the paid labor market and women specializing in services 
within the home. A recent paper by followers of Becker (Greenwood and Guner, 2004) attributes 
the decline of marriage to the technological change that has resulted in a reduction in the need for 
labor at home, which sends women into the paid labor force and reduces the efficiencies resulting 
from specialization within marriage. So, on this account, the invention of the vacuum cleaner and 
the refrigerator and the development of takeout food has made an important contribution to the 
decline of marriage. 
  
  Women’s employment has increased the number of open lesbian relationships, as the 
attainment of a decent standard of living without a man in the household became possible. We are 
just beginning to see the emergence of lesbianism among teenagers. 
 
  One component of the decline in marriage is the increase in divorce. This was bound to 
happen. A life-long commitment means wretched misery for a lifetime if you make a stupid 
mistake. So an escape hatch was needed and has been duly provided by a sensible society, in the 
form of divorce-at-will. 
 
  Without question, the decline in fertility and the decline in marriage must be connected. 
Which way does causation run? Has a lowered desire for children reduced the desire to marry? Or 
has the decline in the willingness of males and females to marry caused the decline in fertility? It 
is not hard to believe that both effects are occurring. A declining interest in having children is 
bound to produce a declining interest in forming a long-term liaison with a person of the opposite 
sex, a liaison that will constrict one’s sexual options and may be difficult to dissolve without emotional and financial complications. A declining part of the population allied in marriage 
means that fewer people are in position to assume on a long-term basis the duties of parenthood if 
a pregnancy occurs. Contraception has reduced fertility within marriage, reducing the period in 
which a woman’s children need intense care, during which male help is most crucial.  
 
(Table 3 about here.) 
 
  Despite better contraception, however, the rise in the proportion of the population that is 
unmarried has meant more out-of-wedlock births, not fewer, as shown in Table 3. The speed of 
increase in such births shown in the table is striking. The proportion of babies born to unmarried 
women has doubled over a ten-year period, or nearly so, in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Spain. In France, Norway, and Sweden, more than half of the births are to unmarried women. 
 
4. Is there a way to revive marriage? 
 
  Is the increasing substitution of these other forms of household for marriage no great 
tragedy, as some sociologists claim? Such claims seem to arise from political correctness. But 
these changes involve a great loss for heterosexual women. The decline of marriage does have 
enormous implications. The decline of marriage takes a heavy emotional toll on those who 
divorce and those who want to marry but cannot get a marriage partner. Singlehood can be 
devastatingly lonely.   
 
  Lone parents, many of whom live with their children in poverty, are now a considerable 
part of the population. Even with a decent job, lone motherhood is hugely difficult. On the other 
hand, those women who avoid lone motherhood and refrain from having children until they are 
married may end up with none, to their great regret. Most women want very much to marry, and 
the failure on their part to win out against the competition for an ever smaller crop of men who 
want to marry ruins their lives. If we have a choice between nearly universal marriage and no 
marriage, then the former is probably better. But if the choice is between a sizable segment of the 
population being unable to marry and no marriage, then no marriage might be the most humane 
alternative.  
 
  Social scientists have been and remain divided as to the seriousness of these 
developments. In the 1970s and 1980s some of the leading sociologists specializing in domestic 
relations told us not to worry, because divorce was merely replacing death as a way to end 
marriages (Cherlin, 1981). Besides, most divorcees remarried. Today, many scholars in this field 
tell us that lone parents, gay and lesbian couples, and cohabiting couples are not only worthy of 
respect, but are capable of performing well the functions traditionally performed by the married. 
Conservatives disagree, and view the decline of marriage as disastrous for society. They point to 
research that shows that children brought up in such situations tend to do less well on average 
(Popenoe,  2008).They correctly attribute the decline of marriage to the increase in non-marital 
sex. For religious conservatives that means an increase in sinning. 
 
  I believe that the conservatives are right in their diagnosis of the seriousness of the 
situation, because of the difficulties faced by lone mothers and their children. However, I don’t 
believe they have the right remedy. Religious conservatives would like to move in the direction of 
the Muslim model of relations between the sexes: strict chastity for unmarried women, and for 
married women isolation within the home, no outside employment, and submission to the “leadership” of the husband. The preaching of abstinence from sex before marriage, the attack on 
abortion and contraception have as their purpose the repeal of the sexual revolution. The home 
schooling movement serves to keep women at home until the youngest child is18 years old. The 
religious right would like to make divorce more difficult. Some states are allowing those marrying 
to choose a “covenant” form of union that is harder to dissolve. 
 
  Recently in the U.S. there have been government-sponsored initiatives to promote 
marriage and reduce divorce along the lines proposed by the religious right. Hundred of millions 
of dollars of government money are being spent for training courses and counseling for 
prospective spouses and for spouses in shaky marriages, many run under religious auspices. The 
pre-marriage courses may actually reduce the number of marriages that take place, as prospective 
spouses begin to question whether they can make a go of it, and bail out of the engagement. This 
is not a bad effect, and the marriages that do take place may be stronger, but reducing both the 
marriage and divorce rate by about the same amount may not do much to decrease the proportion 
of children in single parent homes. 
 
  The U.S. government is also spending money for sex education courses in the schools that 
promote abstinence from sex prior to marriage. Those behind this effort eliminate from these 
courses any mention of contraceptives, and they oppose the availability of abortion, so the net 
effect of their activities on the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and births is doubtful and 
may even be positive. D. Kirby, National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, Emerging Answers: Research Findings 
on Programs to Reduce Teen Pregnancy, at 88 (May 2001) 
 
  The decline in the practice of the “shotgun marriage”, which occurred when a non-marital 
sexual relationship led to a pregnancy and the man involved was successfully pressured to marry 
the mother-to-be, has plausibly been cited as a major cause of the increase in out-of-wedlock 
births (Akerlof, Yellen and Katz, 1996). The brides in these cases probably had few options other 
than to accede to the wedding. Given the unwilling attitude of their bridegrooms, the post-
wedding situation of these brides and their children could hardly have been enviable in many 
cases. The religious right in the U.S. may have the ambition to bring back the shotgun marriage. 
The 17 year-old unmarried daughter of the Republican vice presidential candidate, an evangelical 
Christian, is pregnant, and is apparently being forced to marry the brutish youth who impregnated 
her, who announced on his web site that he does not want to be a father. 
 
  Whether such changes could be successfully engineered is questionable. They would 
require a reversal of the sexual revolution of the 1960s. If they succeeded, they might bring back 
painful stigma. But we may question whether an effective menu of nonpunitive policies with good 
success rates could be devised and implemented. These considerations concerning the desirability, 
feasibility, and human cost suggest that deterring lone motherhood should not be an important 
consideration when policies are designed. 
 
  Should we hope the conservatives’ plan succeeds? Not if you believe that we should avoid 
a caste system that severely circumscribes women’s lives. We have to face the fact that gender 
equality may be incompatible with the preservation of marriage as a key social institution.  
In any case, conservatives’ measures have not so far succeeded in slowing the decline of marriage. 
Abstinence education has not been shown to reduce teen sex.  
 
  People who need marriage promotion and counseling are the ones least likely to sign up for it. Very few couples have chosen covenant marriage in the conservative states that are offering 
it. It is not clear that making divorce more difficult would increase the number of people in well-
functioning marriages. However, evangelical Christianity is the fastest growing religion on the 
planet, so it is conceivable that society could evolve back to the Muslim model spontaneously. Do 
those who are repelled by the Muslim model yet who deplore the decline of marriage have any 
ideas for reviving it? Not that we have heard. They mostly say “hurrah for marriage” and leave it 
at that. 
 
   The religious right’s formula for saving marriage is to tighten it up—essentially to reduce 
sex outside of marriage, at least for women. Another plan would be to go in the opposite direction 
and loosen it up, à la française. This might make men more willing to marry, since marriage 
would be less constricting sexually. About 30 years ago, I heard a lecture on French family life by 
the sociologist Evelyn Sullerot. She said, “We in France are very loyal to our spouses. We treasure 
them, have enduring love for them, depend on them for all kinds of things. But...(dramatic pause).. 
there is one thing for which we don’t depend on them...(another dramatic pause).. and that is 
romance.” Parisian lovers traditionally meet after work, “cinq à sept”, and then go home to their 
spouses and children. These “open marriages” have been going on in France at least since the 
eighteenth century. Given that we have well-working contraception, “open marriage” could 
separate the child-raising function of marriage from its “romantic” aspect, at least after the 
marriage has gone on for a while. Marriage might become essentially a contract to raise children, 
and to have no children by any other partner. Each spouse would understand that there might be 
discreet liaisons with others on the part of the other spouse. The main difference from the way 
marriage is understood today would be that “romance” with another would be no reason to take 
offense, would be considered far less hurtful, and no reason to break up the marriage.  
 
  Of course, there are today many marriages that endure despite infidelity, and not all of 
them are in France. Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy and Bill Clinton, in addition to 
extracurricular “romances”, seem to have had casual sex at every opportunity, as was well known 
to their wives. A considerable proportion of the candidates and family members in the 2008 
presidential election in the United States have been implicated in non-marital sex. 
 
  Unfortunately, the French system of open marriage has not succeeded in retarding the 
decline of marriage in that country. The proportion of the female population currently married 
continues to drop.  Half of the children in France are born to unmarried women, and the share of 
lone parent families in France is increasing rapidly. 
 
  Kinsey(1948), decades ago, found a high percentage of married men and women were 
adulterers. Of course, open marriages–marriages where sex with others is fully anticipated-- have 
their own difficulties. People may have children with multiple partners, and may want to live with 
new partners. It may also be true that open marriage inevitably brings resentment and hurt, and 
that expected infidelity would reduce whatever satisfaction there now is in marriage. An increase 
in open marriage might decrease rather than increase the number of lasting relationships, as 
adultery increased from its already high level. 
 
  The remedies that conservatives are suggesting will not work, and would be unfair and 
undesirable. Nor does open marriage seem to offer a way out. We need to find other ways to 
repair at least some of the damage. The economic problems that face women who want to raise 
children outside of marriage need to be be fixed, and can be fixed. But the emotional problems may be irreparable. 
 
5. Is cohabitation an adequate substitute for marriage? 
 
  Anxiety at the rise in the proportion of babies born to unmarried women has been 
somewhat reduced by the thought that many of them are born to cohabiting couples. As the 
currently married share of the population has dwindled, cohabitation by the unmarried has grown 
rapidly. In Europe and the English-speaking countries outside of Europe, cohabitation is growing 
rapidly, as shown in Table 4. 
 
(Table 4 about here.) 
  
  What, if anything, is the difference between cohabitation and marriage? Just an expensive 
ceremony? Cohabiting couples are those who for one reason or another have refrained from 
marriage, at least so far. That means they are a selected group of people with less of a commitment 
than married couples, and break up more often.  
 
  Presumably, most married couples are committed to the permanence of the relationship, at 
least at the beginning. The degree of committment to a permanent relationship among cohabitants 
probably varies considerably. Some cohabitants are just enjoying the advantages and economies of 
living together, with no pledges or intention of permanence on the part of either member. Other 
cohabitants may consider marriage and cohabitation as the same thing, and simply think an 
expensive celebration is unnecessary. Still others may view themselves as testing out their 
compatibility for marriage. Some individuals who enter cohabitation rather than marriage may be 
worrying about the difficulties and costs of divorce if the relationship fails. 
 
  Apparently, cohabitation is considerably less stable than marriage. A survey of married 
couples suggests that couples that cohabited prior to marriage have less happy and thus 
presumably less stable marriages. (Amato, Booth, et al, 2007). Most cohabiting couples in the 
United States who have a child break up in the next three years. (England and Edlin, 2007). 
 
  Most importantly, as Table 5 shows, the rise in cohabitation has not sufficed to prevent the 
rise in the proportion of families with children who have only one parent in the home. In the vast 
majority of cases, the lone parent is female. This is the most important result of the decline in 
marriage, with the greatest potential for doing harm to children.  
 
(Table 5 about here.) 
 
 
6. Needed: A New View of Single Motherhood 
 
  Unmarried women who give birth to children have historically been viewed as outcasts, 
and there has been no tradition of considering them worthy citizens fulfilling an important societal 
function, and treating them and their children with generosity. The low support for lone 
motherhood has been part of a societal effort to prevent it, or at least to keep it down to a 
minimum. Traditionally, it has been considered disgraceful for a woman to have sex outside of 
marriage, even involuntarily. In some parts of the world being raped by a man other than the 
woman’s husband brings a death sentence. The disgrace of lone motherhood was an important part  
of the enforcement by human society of a code of sexual behavior buttressing the institution of 
marriage. Today the shame of being an unmarried mother has diminished. Nevertheless, almost 
half a century into the sexual revolution, sexual behavior that a man might boast of will be labeled 
low, sluttish and disgraceful in a woman.  
 
  A second reason for public hostility to lone mothers is a desire to keep the economic 
support of children by the public purse to a minimum. The taxpayers who support their own 
children, resent having to contribute to the support of the children of those who transgress 
traditional sexual rules governing women’s behavior. Her sluttish behavior is costing the taxpayers 
money. Part of the resentment derives from the design of public aid to lone mothers. It originated 
in the nineteen thirties, when jobs were scarce and “needed to be reserved for men”. Few married 
mothers held jobs, and children (including teenagers) were thought to need a full-time mother. So 
the support for lone mothers consisted of a guarantee of a sub-poverty level stipend that was given 
on condition that the mother not take a paid job. Later, under President Ronald Reagan’s right 
wing regime, the single mothers who acceded to being sheltered in such a program and refraining 
from paid work were derided as lazy, producing babies so as to get and enlarge their government 
payment. The shortage of suitable husbands is most acute among racial minorities, and the fact that 
lone mothers are disproportionately from such groups contributes to the low reputation of single 
mothers among those of racist inclinations. In the U.S., the vilification of single mothers who were 
welfare clients peaked in the 1980s and 90s and culminated in the punitive “welfare reform” of 
1996 during the Clinton Administration, which took away the guarantee of support.  
 
  These days, those who would like to reduce the incidence of lone motherhood emphasize 
the bad outcomes for children. (Popenoe, 2007) A number of studies have shown that children 
brought up by lone mothers have a greater likelihood of doing poorly than children brought up by 
married couples. A higher incidence of bad outcomes has been observed even in Sweden, where 
the income support and government help in obtaining high-quality child care are far more generous 
than in most other countries (Weitoft, Hjern, Haglund and Rosén, 2003). 
 
  In thinking about policy toward lone mothers, we have to consider the likelihood of success 
for a policy of discouraging lone motherhood. Societal efforts to get child-rearing confined to 
married couples have been increasingly unsuccessful in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Imposing punitive conditions on lone mothers has not in recent times prevented an increase in their 
numbers. The rise in the proportion of mothers without husbands has been relentless. In the United 
States, a steady fall in the real value of government help to lone mothers has not prevented their 
numbers from growing.  
 
  A large number of studies have looked at the variation in stipends for single mothers 
among states of the U.S. to see whether the amount of help that single mothers can receive affects 
out-of wedlock births. Some reviewers of that evidence come to the conclusion that reducing 
welfare stipends for the support of lone mothers does not reduce the entry to single motherhood, 
but the verdict is not unanimous (National Research Council, 1998; Moffitt, 2001). It remains to be 
seen whether the “welfare reform” of 1996, which withdrew from many at-home single mothers 
any stipend at all will reduce the incidence of lone motherhood (Blank, 2002). 
 
  We have to consider the harm that policies that attempt to minimize the extent of lone 
motherhood might cause. Policies intended to deter women from entering lone motherhood, that 
work by keeping single-mother families at a low standard of living (mainly by failing to help  
them), obviously do harm to those children who, despite such policies, have to live with lone 
mothers. Even if we decided that, other things being equal, society would gain from keeping the 
numbers of lone mothers low, the cost to children of imposing immiserating policies should rule 
them out on humanitarian grounds. 
 
  Condemning lone mothers and their children to more punitive living conditions may 
somewhat reduce their number, but at a cost of bad lives for many of the children who are 
nevertheless put in that situation. How low should such support be so as to discourage (or at least 
avoid encouraging) the out-of-wedlock births and divorces that create lone motherhood?  
 
  To the extent that the decline of marriage is caused by men’s increasing reluctance to 
marry, we can expect an increase in the number of women who cannot acquire a suitable and 
willing husband, but who want children and so get pregnant anyway. We will have to accept the 
fact that the mode of supporting human reproduction has changed and change our institutions in 
accordance.  
 
   Some have  suggested that every woman has the right to have whatever children she 
desires (Jencks, 1995).
 This proposed right is easiest to accept in the case of a never-married 
woman at age 35, without a husband or reliable partner in sight, but with a good job, who decides 
to become a mother. But how should we regard and treat the high school student who has a baby 
when she is 16, or the woman who produces six out-of-wedlock children with multiple partners? 
How should we regard and treat the partners of these women? These are cases of unwise 
reproductive behavior, and we might advocate avoiding such behavior whether the people in 
question were married or not. These hard cases do not, however, justify a negative attitude toward 
all lone mothers, much less the victimization of children in single-parent families by punitive 
policy. 
 
   Not every woman can arrange to be married at a time when she would want to have a baby 
or has one on the way, and increasing numbers of women are finding that they cannot manage to 
marry a man acceptable to them at any time during their fertile period. There is no politically 
acceptable way to stop substantial numbers of them from having children. Nor is there a way to 
prevent all teenagers from being careless and heedless, or all married or cohabiting couples from 
breaking up. So some lone motherhood is inevitable.  
 
(Table 6 about here.) 
 
  In thinking about changes in policy toward the support of lone mothers, it is important to 
understand that the lone mother and her children are severely disadvantaged as compared to 
couples with children in two important respects. The first is income, and the second is the time of 
adults available for carrying on the activities of family life, such as nurturing children, shopping, 
preparing food, cleaning up, doing laundry, paying bills, making visits to physicians, and so on. 
Table 6, based on numbers from the U.S., displays the problem. A couple has the wage earned by a 
male, which in every country is substantially higher than the wage earned by a female, due to 
discrimination against women in access to sex-typed jobs and discrimination in pay. (Single 
mothers also have lower educational achievement on average than married men, which further 
lowers their average pay.) The lone mother who holds a job is not only way off the mainstream in 
money for living expenses, but is also particularly short of time to attend to household tasks. In the 
U.S., the low-level job she may need to take will not offer health insurance, or sick leave. A lone  
mother who stays home with a government stipend (assuming she is permitted to do so) is more 
generously endowed with time, and will have health insurance, but in the United States will have a 
pitifully small cash income.  
 
  The two-earner couple and the lone job-holding mother are both in need of child care 
services. If the lone mother has to purchase them, this makes the disparity between her living 
standard and that of the couples far worse. 
  
  Generous programs would make it easier to have an out-of-wedlock child, and might well 
accelerate the decline of marriage. But there will be out-of-wedlock children whether or not public 
policy supports them generously. If it doesn’t there will continue to be a lot of deprived children. 
We have a choice. We can reduce the misery of the current crop of children living with lone 
mothers, but at a cost of speeding up the increase in their numbers. Or we can make their lot in life 
more difficult in the probably vain hope of keeping their numbers down. 
 
6. Can males be brought back to the support of reproduction? 
 
  Up to now, the only way that has been attempted to recapture resources from males for the 
support of their offspring has been through the mechanism of child support payments.  In U.S. law, 
biological parents who don’t live with their children owe child support payments, whether the 
child was conceived in wedlock or in a one-night stand. Efforts have been made over recent 
decades to strengthen the administration of child support enforcement, but in the United States a 
majority of mandated payments are still not made, and progress in improving compliance is almost 
nonexistent, as shown by Table 7. Ideas for improving collection include changing the origination 
and administration of child support payments from the courts to the tax collection agency. 
Regulation of the amounts to be paid would be governed by fixed formulas in the tax law 
(Huang,Chien-Chung, Mincy, and Garfinkel, 2005). It should be noted that child support 
payments, even if made faithfully, do not make up for the failure of fathers who live apart from 
their children to take part in housework, child care, and other family activities. Resident husbands 
have in recent years been increasing their participation in this kind of service. 
 
(Table 7 about here.) 
 
  Child support payments are hard to collect in part because men consider them unjust. For 
one, the decision to continue a pregnancy is the mother’s alone, so she has the call on whether the 
man has to make 18 years of heavy payments. Second, the payment is understood as owed to the 
child, rather than the child’s household. However, the payment becomes part of and increases the 
income of the household, and so some of it will be used to buy things for the mother. A better 
source of additional income for lone parents might be a government payment, financed by a tax on 
all adults (or perhaps all men) 25-60, with an exemption for those living with a child. 
 
 
8. The best way of supporting lone parents 
 
  The continued rise in the proportion of children who live with lone mothers, and the 
deprivation that is the lot of large numbers of them, is a grave and growing blemish on our 
societies. As time passes and the problem grows, it should become clear (at least to more people 
than understand it now) that considerably more generous help from government to lone mothers  
would be desirable. Among the developed countries, the United States probably has the worst 
record on supporting lone mothers up to now, but all of them need to do more. 
 
 In  considering  the  characteristics of such a program, there are three headings under which 
discussion is needed. The first concerns the standard of living that such a program might provide. 
The second is the question of whether lone mothers should be supported so that they can, if they 
wish, give full-time care to their children. The third is the nature of the help that should be given–
whether it should consist largely in cash (from government grants and/or higher wages engineered 
by government policy) or alternatively should consist in large part in government-financed and 
government-provided services.  
 
 
 What Standard of Life Might Be Provided? 
 
  On average, the living standard of single mothers and their children is in all countries 
below that of couples with children. In the U.S., 37 percent of single mothers with children under 
18 are below the official poverty line. (The US official poverty line was set up in the 1960s, when 
most married or unmarried mothers did not have jobs, and doctors and hospitals treated poor 
people for free. It makes no allowance for funds to buy health insurance or child care. Today, the 
expression “out of poverty” ought to signify at least enough income to provide the 1960s package 
of goods and services plus an ability to take care of health and child care needs.)  
 
  Conservatives and libertarians might advocate no help at all to lone or single mothers, so as 
to promote self-sufficiency and to discourage entry to single motherhood. However, most Western 
governments have officially drawn poverty lines, and reductions in the poverty rate, especially for 
children, are considered grounds for satisfaction. That suggests public sanction for help that at 
least brings lone mothers to the poverty line. A considerably higher goal is possible: to provide 
sufficient help to get lone mothers and their children into the mainstream. A possible definition of 
“mainstream” would be a lifestyle modestly below that of the median one-earner couple. 
 
  Implementing either the “poverty line” or “mainstream” standard could not as a matter of 
politics and justice be restricted to lone-mother families. Couples with children would also have to 
be helped if they fall below that level. 
 
Should Full-time Mothering Be Supported? 
 
  Should lone mothers who want to stay home with their children be supported in doing that? 
In designing future policy, we could not advocate a return to a regime of poverty-level welfare 
payments. The stipends for stay-at-home mothers, if they were to be established as entitlements, 
would have to be two or three times as large as welfare payments have been. Further, to confine 
such stipends to lone mothers would be considered unfair (and would indeed be unfair). Stipends 
(not necessarily the same size, but nevertheless sizeable ones) would have to be given to married 
mothers who stayed home with their own children. 
 
  Offering large stipends to married and unmarried mothers (or to parents of either sex) who 
stay home with their children would probably increase the number of women who spend 
considerable time out of the labor force with the birth of each child. Now 60 percent of American 
mothers of children under one year old are in the labor force. Employers can with some confidence  
depend on women workers’ continuity on the job, treat them as fit for responsible jobs, and 
therefore consider them promotable. Prolonged absences would threaten a reversal of the gains that 
women have made in the last half century. Those gains–in educational opportunity, in the freedom 
to practice occupations and professions previously reserved for men, in the independence and 
status that comes with working for pay–could be lost as employers with good reason ceased to 
view women as having a continuous attachment to the labor force. 
 
  One can see the effect of such a policy in the case of Sweden, where the stipend is given in 
the form of paid parental leave, which can be taken for a year after a birth and extended further at a 
lower stipend. Fathers are given incentives to share the leave, but take only a small percentage of 
the leave time. Probably as a result of this system, Swedish women are very highly segregated into 
female-dominated service occupations (Haas and Hwang, 1999).   
 
  There is thus a tension between supporting mothers to stay at home with their children and 
gender equality, which arguably depends on men and women having similar life courses and 
activities (Bergmann, 1998). Where one comes down in this matter depends on the value one puts 
on gender equality, what value one puts on validating and preserving women’s specialization in 
caring roles, one’s beliefs as to the quality of familial care versus non-familial care, and what 
social arrangements one believes constitute gender equality. 
 
  My own view is that stipends for taking care of one’s own children, including those in the 
form of lengthy paid parental leave, would cause a grave and unacceptable loss of gender equality. 
A compromise position that would preserve gender equity would provide six weeks of paid leave 
on the birth or adoption of a child to each of at most two adults residing in the household. 
 
The Nature of the Help - What Mix of Cash and Services? 
 
  Government help to raise the standard of living of employed lone mothers comes in two 
forms–cash they can spend as they like or services. The cash can take the form of children’s 
allowances, tax breaks, wage supplements, government-engineered rises in the wage rates 
employers pay, basic income grants, lump sum capital transfers. The services might include health 
insurance, child care, housing, higher and vocational education services for parent or child. They 
can be provided in government facilities or paid for by subsidies or vouchers to private providers. 
 
  In thinking about the appropriate mix, the idea of “merit goods” is crucial (Musgrave, 
1959). We label a good or service a “merit good” when we decide that as a society we should 
allow no one to do without it. We depend on government provision of such goods when we cannot 
rely on families buying it for themselves, either because of lack of resources or because family 
priorities differ from public ones. It is important to emphasize that, given the dollar magnitudes 
involved, even a doubling of the minimum wage, or a hefty monthly child allowance, would not 
alone do the job of getting all families a set of  “merit goods” that many would agree on.  
 
  We already treat K-12 education as a merit good. Access to higher education for all also 
needs to be achieved. Health insurance is something that most people would agree also meets the 
definition of a merit good, something that we should not tolerate people going without. (As is well 
known, among developed countries, this is a problem only in the U.S.) No government-engineered 
improvement in cash income through cash benefits or better wages could insure that families 
would be covered. To achieve that, all families would have to be enrolled in a government- 
specified program of health insurance, with the government payment going to the provider. 
 
  I would argue that a decent standard of child care, including after-school and summer care 
for school-aged children, should  also be treated as a merit good. Child care costs can run to $4-6 
thousand a year per child. Insuring that children get good care requires government provision of 
child care itself, some of it perhaps in the form of universal pre-kindergarten. 
 
  With free health insurance and child care, a lone parent in the United States with two 
children with a minimum wage job, plus current cash-like government benefits, would have after-
tax cash income modestly above the official poverty line. If we are thinking of allowing a more 
mainstream style of life, we might give access to services that constitute the major features of such 
a lifestyle: a dwelling unit in a safe neighborhood, and higher or vocational education, with a 
sliding scale of co-payments or none. Arguably, in a rich country they are also merit goods. Or, in 
addition to health insurance and child care, a scheme of wage supplements might be developed, so 
that the wage income of those earning less than the median one-earner couple would be brought 
closer to the latter. 
 
  Again, all of the benefits listed above would have to be provided, not just to lone mothers, 
but to the entire population. To do otherwise would bring down resentment on lone mothers. We 
also need a stepped-up campaign to reduce the sex discrimination that has kept women out of well 
paying jobs, particularly those in the skilled blue-collar trades. 
 
  
Political Feasibility of Such a Set of Programs 
 
  All of the benefits proposed above already exist in some form in all developed countries, 
even in the United States. Their existence attests to an understanding on the part of public and 
politicians that they alleviate problems that we would like to see dealt with but that many families 
cannot overcome without help. The difficulty of transforming these programs into fully funded 
versions with improved benefits and appropriately broad coverage, which would bring the United 
States and other countries into line with the social democracies of Scandinavia and France, would 
be formidable. Such programs would require much enlarged government sectors, and tax rates on 
the order of 60 percent of GDP. This might be particularly difficult in the light of the globalization 
of the labor market, which is putting downward pressure on wage rates in the developed countries. 





Table 1. Proportion of the female 
population  that  is  married       
       
       
       
  1980 1990 2000 2006  
Austria 0.439 0.456 0.445    
Belgium 0.505 0.492 0.458 0.425   
Canada 0.485 0.491 0.485 0.482   
Czech Republic    0.485 0.463 0.439   
Denmark 0.447 0.412 0.400 0.395   
Estonia 0.433 0.436 0.350    
Finland 0.428 0.408 0.376 0.370   
France 0.467 0.434 0.403 0.382   
Germany     0.456 0.437   
Hungary 0.596 0.546 0.410 0.394   
Iceland 0.406 0.373 0.355 0.344   
Ireland 0.384 0.378 0.378    
Italy     0.501 0.491   
Netherlands 0.482 0.462 0.441 0.421   
Norway 0.471 0.434 0.388 0.374   
Poland  0.473 0.474    
Romania 0.512 0.513 0.521 0.472   
Slovakia 0.477 0.468 0.450 0.438   
Slovenia   0.454 0.428 0.409   
Spain   0.469 0.477    
Sweden 0.428 0.396 0.353 0.340   
Switzerland 0.458 0.462 0.447 0.447   
       
Source: UNECE Statistical Division 
Database,  compiled  from  national         
official  sources           
         
 Definition: The marital status is defined as 
the  legal  conjugal         
status of each individual in relation to the 
marriage  laws  (or         
customs)  in  the  country.         
        
 
Table 2. Marriage and fertility in the 
U.S.    








married women  40-44 
        
1950    65.8    
1960    65.9    
1970    61.9    
1977  1977    3.13  
1980    58.9  2.99  
1990    56.9  2.05  
1993    56.4    
1994    55.9    
1995    56.2    
1996    55.6    
1997    54.9    
1998    54.9    
1999    54.7    
2000    54.7  1.91  
2001    54.6    
2002    54.2  1.93  
2003    54.0    
2004    54.0  1.90  
2005    53.8    
2006    53.4    





Percentage of Births to Unmarried Women 








Australia  1995 26.6 2005 32.2  21.1
Canada  1995 30.5 2005 25.6  -16.1
Denmark  1995 46.5 2005 45.7  -1.7
France  1996 38.9 2006 50.5  29.8
Germany  1996 17.0 2006 30.0  76.5
Italy  1995 8.1 2005 15.4  90.1
Netherlands  1996 16.4 2006 35.0  113.4
New 
Zealand  1995 40.7 2005 45.2  11.1
Norway  1996 48.3 2005 53.0  9.7
Spain  1995 11.1 2005 26.6  139.6
Sweden  1996 53.9 2006 55.5  3.0
United 
Kingdom  1996 35.5 2006 43.7  23.1
US  1996 32.4 2006 38.5  18.8
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK extracted 
from United Nations Economic Commission on Europe, Statistical Database, Gender 
Statistics (http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/Default.asp). 
Australia: Bureau of Statistics, Cat 4102, Social Trends, National Summary 1996-2006, 
Table 1. 
Canada: Annual Demographic Statistics and CANISM, Statistics Canada, Births, 2005, 
Table 2-5. 
New Zealand: Demographic Trends, Statistics New Zealand. 
US: Births: Data for 1996 and Births: Preliminary Data for 2006, Table 1 (release date 
Dec 2007). 
Source: David Popenoe,  Cohabitation, Marriage and Child Wellbeing: A Cross-National 
Perspective 













Australia 1996  10.1  2006  15.0 48.5  
Canada 1995  13.9  2006  18.4 32.4  
Denmark 1995  24.7  2006  24.4 -1.2  
France 1995  13.6  2001  17.2 26.5  
Germany 1995 8.2  2005  11.2 36.6  
Italy 1995  3.1  2003  3.8 22.6  
Netherlands 1995  13.1  2004  13.3 1.5  
New Zealand  1996  14.9  2006  23.7 59.1  
Norway 2001  20.3  2007  21.8 7.4  
Spain        2002  2.7 NA  
Sweden 1995  23.0  2005  28.4 23.5  
United 
Kingdom  1995 10.1  2004 15.4 52.5  
US 1995  5.1  2005  7.6 49.0  
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain generated from United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE), Statistical Database, Gender Statistics 
(http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/Default.asp). 
Australia: Statistics Australia Census Tables, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cat. No. 
2914 (2006) and No. 4102 (1996).   
Canada: Statistics Canada 2007, Legal Marital Status, Common-law Status, Age Groups 
& Sex.   
Denmark: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1995) & Statistics Denmark 
(2006).   
New Zealand: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Families and Households & 2006 Table 
Builder, Marital Status.   
Norway: Statistics Norway, Population & Historical Census, Table 24 and Statistical Data 
Bank.   
Sweden: For 1995, all couples from United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
data less married women from Statistics Sweden. For 2005, Population Table 28 and 
Statistics Sweden Statistical Database. 
 
Great Britain: Focus on Families & Focus on Families National Statistics.   
United States: America's Families and Living Arrangements, 1995 & 2005 (rate is based 
on self-identified unmarried cohabitors not POSSLQ (Persons of the Opposite Sex 
Sharing Living Quarters). 
 
  
Source: David Popenoe,  Cohabitation, Marriage and Child Wellbeing: A Cross-National 
Perspective 










Lone-Parent Families as Percent of all Families with 
Children 
  
   1990s/early 00s  mid to late 00s 
% 
Change
Australia 1996  18.3 2006 20.7 13.1
Canada 1996  22.3 2006 29.1 30.5
Denmark 2000  18.3 2007 20.7 13.1
France 1990  14.5 2001 18.0 24.1
Germany 1995  18.4 2005 20.1 9.2
Italy 1995  14.4 2003 16.5 14.6
Netherlands 1996  15.6 2006 20.0 28.2
New 
Zealand  2001 30.7 2006 32.0 4.2
Norway 2001  19.1 2006 21.3 11.5
Spain 1990  9.2 2002 13.2 43.5
Sweden 1990  18.0 2006 24.5 36.1
United 
Kingdom 1998  23.9 2005 25.9 8.4
US 1996  28.3 2006 27.8 -1.8
*To make comparisons consistent, lone-parent families refer to a single parent and a child or 
children. Married parents or cohabiting parents are counted as a two-parent family. 
Australia: Children <15. Family and Community National Summary 1996-2006, Australian Social 
Trends 2006, Table 1. *No distinction between married & defacto couples in Australian Social 
Trends 2006. 
Canada: Children <18. Table 111-0011 & 06 Profile of Language, Mobility & Immigration. Statistics 
Canada (Base = all families with children) & 1996 Census Tables. Lone-parent families based on 
20% sample. 
Denmark: Children <18. Statistics Denmark, Table Fam1. FAM44 calculated from STABANK 
DENMARK 
France: 1990 & 2001 data calculated using Eurostats data extraction. (Base = couple with children 
households and lone parent families) 
Germany: Children <15 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. (Base = couple with 
children households & lone-parent households.) 
Italy: Children <15 United Nations Economic Comission for Europe. (Base = couple with children 
households & lone-parent households.) 
Netherlands: Size & Composition of Household, Position in Household, Jan. 1996-2007. Statistics 
Netherland.  
New Zealand: Table 3. National Family & Household Projections: 01 thru 21. (2006 data based on 
projections from Series 5B projections.) 
Norway: Children <18. Lone-parent families as a percent of all families with children, Statistical 
Yearbook; Statistics Norway, Table 63. 
Spain: Children <15 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. (Base = couple with children 
households & lone-parent households.) 
Sweden: Children <18. Census 1990; and Women and Men in Sweden, 2006. 
UK: Families by Type and Presence of Children, Labor Force Survey, Office for National Statistics, 
2006 & Living in Britain 1976-2000, General Household Survey, Table 3.7. (Base = couple with 
children and lone-parent families for all children <18 unless child not in school.) 
US: Calculations using Table FM-2. All parent/child situations by type race & Hispanic origin: 1970 
to present. Lone parent totals less unmarried couples total from Table UC-1. Unmarried-Couple 















$93,217 $55,638 $24,949  $5,200
waking parental 
hours at home 
per weekday 
12 22 6  16 
 cost of child   
care 
               $8,500                          0                 $8,500                           0 
income after 
paying for child 
care 
$84,717               $55,638             $16,449                 $5,200 





Child Support enforcement in the US. 
 1993 2005
Custodial mothers awarded 
support (%) 
57.0 57.3
    Of those awarded 
support: 
  
Average child support due  $4,827 $5,660
Average child support 
received 
$3,166 $3,660
Received any child support 
(%) 
76.1 77.5
Received full amount due (%)  36.8 47.3
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